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LIFE AFTER HARDWICK
Nan D. Hunter*
Unless or until it is narrowed or overruled, Bowers v.
Hardwick' will dominate the law concerning government regula-
tion of sexuality. In Hardwick the Supreme Court upheld as con-
stitutional a Georgia sodomy statute that made oral or anal inter-
course a felony punishable by up to twenty years in prison.2 The
Court ended its long reluctance to assess the constitutionality of
limitations on sexuality as distinct from contraception3 by ruling
that the protected zone created by the privacy right stops short of
covering private consensual sexual relations between adults. In so
ruling, the Court left in place a patchwork of prohibitory laws in
which identical acts are immunized or criminalized as one tra-
verses state borders.4
Although Hardwick was litigated as a sexual privacy case,
and despite the fact that the Georgia statute drew no distinctions
based on sexual orientation, the case has been interpreted primar-
ily as a ruling on homosexuality. The Court explicitly limited its
holding to the legitimacy of laws criminalizing sexual acts between
persons of the same sex, refusing to indicate whether the same
standard of deference to legislative determinations of morality
would apply if pairs of the opposite sex engaged in the prohibited
behavior.5 Since Hardwick was decided, the threshold question in
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, and founder and former Director,
American Civil Liberties Union Lesbian and Gay Rights Project and AIDS Project. I would
like to thank Lisa Duggan and Bill Rubenstein for their helpful comments, and Kimberly
Carr, who provided research assistance for this Article. It is a pleasure to join the other
authors in this volume in honoring Norman Dorsen's lifelong devotion to the principles of
individual freedom.
'478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2Id.
3 A majority of the Supreme Court in 1977 stated, "'Mhe Court has not definitively
answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state
statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults,' n.17, infra, and we
do not purport to answer that question now." Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678,
688 n.5 (1977) (citing Id. at 695 n.17 [referring to a statement made later in the same
decision]) (brackets in the original).
4 See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv. L. REv.
1508, 1519-21 (1989).
5 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2.
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the litigation of lesbian and gay rights cases has become whether
Hardwick only extinguishes the claim to a substantive due process
privacy right, or whether it also predetermines challenges under
the Equal Protection Clause. The courts must still decide whether
the decision in Hardwick was a ruling on conduct or a ruling on a
class of people.
The result is an extraordinary new judicial discourse about
the social meaning of homosexuality and the determinants of sex-
ual behavior and sexual identity. It is driven by the needs both of
those who seek repressive measures and of those who seek group-
based civil rights. Both interests require a reliable definitional
structure on which to ground their arguments and a coherent sys-
tem for identifying homosexuality. Both camps accept the idea of
sexual identity as a central aspect of the human condition, but
sharply dispute the definition, expression and regulation of such
identity. Implicit in each adjudication is the threat of reinforcing
or increasing the social penalty accruing to disfavored sexualities,
yet at the same time the very debate itself creates opportunities
to contest hegemonic categories.
The context for the post-Hardwick debate is deeply paradox-
ical. The law is dominated by the emergence of the Rehnquist
Court, well advanced in what has become a liberty demolition
project. At the same time, the investigation of homosexuality has
blossomed in scientific and academic circles. 6 Popular movements
seeking greater political and social freedom for lesbians and gay
men have also mushroomed. 7 These factors ensure that the issues
raised in the post-Hardwick litigation are not transitory.
This Article argues that the term sodomy is a cultural cha-
meleon, which has shifted in meaning from its original delineations
6 See, e.g., JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HIs-
TORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA (1988) [hereinafter INTIMATE MATTERS]; EVE KoSOFSKY
SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990); DAVID HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1990); MARTIN DUBERMAN, MARTHA VICINUS & GEORGE
CHAUNCEY, JR., HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST (1990)
[hereinafter HIDDEN FROM HISTORY]; JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND
THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT
LOVERS: A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (1991). A
lesbian, gay and bisexual studies conference has become an annual event, held to date at
Yale, Harvard and Rutgers Universities. See INSIDE/OUT (Diana Fuss ed., 1991), a collec-
tion of papers presented at the Yale conference in 1989. See also the discussion of homo-
sexuality as biologically different from heterosexuality, infra note 74.
7 See, e.g., Robert Reinhold, Veto of California Job-Bias Bill Unites Gay-Rights Forces
Against Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1991, at A16; Alessandra Stanley, Militants Back
"Queer," Shoving "Gay" the Way of "Negro," N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1991, at A23.
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based primarily on non-procreative sex to a contemporary view
that reflects social anxiety over sexual orientation. Despite its
ideals of constancy and clarity, the law has collaborated in that
shift, as the Supreme Court did, sub silentio, in Hardwick, and as
the majority of the federal judiciary continues to do. This phenom-
enon is now confusing Equal Protection doctrine, and it necessi-
tates a gay-friendly deconstruction of the new sexual orientation
categories.
I. The "Utterly Confused Category" 8
The core of the debate over the ramifications of Hardwick
grows out of the disjuncture between the legal definition of sodomy
and its social and cultural meanings. The crime of sodomy origi-
nated in ecclesiastical regulation of a range of nonmarital, nonpro-
creative sexual practices. Nonprocreation was the central offense
and the core of the crime. 9 Homosexual conduct fell within the
cluster of activities that were regulated, but most early American
statutes defined sodomy in terms of anal intercourse, whether
between men or between a man and a woman.10 The "crime against
nature" to which that phrase refers was not, as is often assumed
today, a crime against heterosexuality, but a crime against
procreation.
Confusion as to the meaning of sodomy is not new. It was
evident in perhaps the first debate in American law over the scope
of its definition: in the winter of 1641-1642, a sodomy case arose
in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Three men were discovered to
have had sexual contact with two female children. John Winthrop's
account of the case described the act as "agitation and effusion of
seed." Vaginal penetration was also alleged, but was denied by
8 The phrase is Foucault's description of sodomy. MICHEL FOUCAULT, A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY 101 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978).
9 INTIMATE MATrRs, supra note 6, at 16, 30. As one court later stated, "[A]l unnatural
acts of carnal copulation between man with man or man with woman, where a penetration
is effected into any opening of the body other than those provided by nature for the
reproduction of the species, are sufficiently contemplated and embraced within the term
'infamous crime against nature ....... In Ex parte Benites, 140 P. 436, 437'(Nev. 1914)
(citing WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1787)).
10 Prohibitions against oral sex were added later. Sodomy also sometimes referred to
intercourse between a human and an animal. The fullest exposition of the history of sodomy
law can be found in Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values:
Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1081-
87 (1988).
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the defendants." The Massachusetts Bay Colony at that time had
not yet adopted a formal body of laws, and the colony's leadership
was unsure with which violation of criminal law to charge these
men and whether their offense merited capital punishment. 2 As a
result, the governor asked jurists and church elders in that colony
and in Plymouth whether the defendants' behavior constituted a
"sodomitical act," punishable by death.13
As these colonists understood sodomy and rape, 14 the primary
legal question at issue was whether proof of penetration was nec-
essary to sustain an offense meriting the death penalty. Bradford
and one of the Plymouth clergymen contended that proof of pen-
etration was required. The two others argued that non-penetrative
acts which led to ejaculation and the "spilling of seed" were com-
parable in infamy to penetrative crimes and should be equally
punished. As one minister put it, the spilling of seed "is equivalent
to killing the man who could have been born out of it."'15
Apparently, none of the disputants suggested that the same-
sex phrasing of the Biblical injunction that a "man shall not lie
with a man as with a woman" precluded a sodomy charge in a
case involving male-female conduct, even though that command
was cited repeatedly as the original source of the law and as the
basis for an analogy to the case before them.' 6 As Jonathan Ned
Katz notes in his summary of the incident, "[tihat this discussion
of 'sodomy' was motivated by a crime of male against female
illustrates the colonists' relative lack of preoccupation with gender
in their categorizing of sexual acts and their relative emphasis on
other characteristics of those acts.' 1 7 The willingness to consider
" JOHN WINTHROP, THE HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND FROM 1630 TO 1649: VOLUME
II 54-55 (1853).
12 The case is described most fully in JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY/LESBIAN ALMANAC
78-82 (1983).
,3 See WILLIAM BRADFORD, OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION 1620-1647, 318-19 (Samuel
Eliot Morison ed., 1966).
'4 The colonists concluded that the men could not be punished with the death sentence
for rape because there was neither a statute nor "express law in the word of God" that
justified such a sentence for rape of an "unripe" girl, and because there was not sufficient
proof of penetration. See WINTHROP, supra note 11, at 56. Additionally, the colonists
believed there was an issue of consent, since at least one of the girls was reported to have
"grown capable of man's fellowship, and took pleasure in it." Id. at 55.
' KATz, supra, note 12, at 79-82; BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 404-13.
6 BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 404-13. Presumably because of the disagreement over
which elements were necessary to the crime, the men were eventually charged with "carnal
knowledge . .. in a most vile & abominal manner" and with "abusing" the girls in an
"unclean & wicked manner." KATZ, supra note 12, at 78.
" KATZ, supra note 12, at 78. At least one commentator has read the meaning of this
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sodomy as meaning something more than same-sex conduct in this
instance is all the more notable since it was only the New England
states-including Massachusetts-which later used a same-sex def-
inition in their early statutes."'
This seventeenth-century debate illustrates fundamental prob-
lems that continue to muddle the law of sexuality. First, the Mas-
sachusetts Bay Colony debate exemplifies the indeterminacy at
the very core of the concept of sodomy. Lacking a statutory def-
inition, the Massachusetts Colony elites drew on their understand-
ing of English law and Biblical prohibitions in an attempt to reach
a jointly acceptable interpretation. Their difficulty in doing so
signified that then, as now, the term sodomy lacked a fixed cultural
or social meaning. Although same-sex conduct was included as
part of the meaning of sodomy, its boundaries were drawn by the
requirements of penetration and nonprocreative acts.
Most colonial sodomy laws regulated sexual acts solely by
men, whether with other men or with women. Proof of phallic
penetration was needed to sustain a conviction for sodomy not
because the crime focused on same-sex conduct, but because its
prohibitions were directed at men. Official acknowledgment of
sexual acts between women within the statutory text was rare,
although enforcement of some statutes against women was initi-
ated under colonial laws.19 Later codifications of or amendments
to sodomy laws encompassed sexual acts between women.20
debate differently, as "the exception that proves the rule" that "the Puritans nearly always
meant homosexuality when they used the term sodomy." Robert F. Oaks, "Things Fearful
to Name": Sodomy and Buggery in Seventeenth Century New England, 12 J. Soc. HIST.
268, 273 (1978). However, D'Emilio and Freedman reject the Oaks interpretation of sodomy
in their book which is the leading synthesis of the historical research. INTIMATE MATTERS,
supra note 6, at 30. If nothing else, these different readings demonstrate the enduring
contestability of the term.
18 Goldstein, supra note 10, at 1083 n.60.
19 KATZ, supra note 12, at 54-60; INTIMATE MATTERS, supra note 6, at 30-31.
20 The Georgia statute before the Supreme Court in Hardwick illustrates this pattern.
In 1939 the state supreme court overturned the conviction of a woman charged with sodomy
for oral sex with another woman on the ground that phallic penetration was a required
element of the crime. Thompson v. Aldridge, 200 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1939). In Riley v. Garret,
133 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. 1963), the same court held that heterosexual cunnilingus also was not
covered. In 1968 the legislature amended the statute to include cunnilingus. Justice Black-
mun incorrectly characterized this amendment as a relatively recent decision by the legis-
lature to include heterosexual conduct within the scope of the statue. Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 200 n.1 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). At the time of the amendment,
heterosexual conduct was already included; it was the possibility of non-phallic conduct
that constituted the modem intervention.
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If the direct prohibitory effect was on men, however, the
indirect and obligatory effect fell heavily on women because the
law sought to force all sexual activities to be at least potentially
procreative. The repulsion expressed by the two Plymouth cler-
gymen for the "spilling of seed" was triggered by the nonprocrea-
tive nature of the defendants' acts. This same aim of the law-
discouragement of nonprocreative sex-underlay the statutes pro-
hibiting the use of birth control devices which were stricken as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the 1960s. 21 Ironically,
in Hardwick, the Court concluded that a privacy claim on behalf
of "homosexual sodomy" bore no relationship to those earlier
decisions: "[n]o connection between . . . procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated
.... 22 In fact, the exact opposite was the case. Michael Hard-
wick, as a person engaged in sodomy, had the same relationship
to procreation as persons using birth control during heterosexual
intercourse: none, which was precisely the point. The issue in
Hardwick should have been controlled by Griswold and
Eisenstadt.
Illustrated by a comparison of the Massachusetts Bay Colony
debate to Hardwick, the second major shift in the law of sexuality
is the role ascribed to "identity." The debate 350 years ago was
clearly a dispute about acts and about which acts, in some specific
detail, constituted a particular crime. It could easily be analogized
to a debate about the elements necessary for burglary or robbery;
about, for example, what the charge should be if property is stolen
from a person or removed from a home. It is not a debate about
a type of person, any more than one discusses theft in terms of
two distinct types of human beings-the robbers and the burglars.
The law does not assume that a certain personality type will com-
mit theft one way, and another personality type, another way.
Anyone could be guilty of either kind of conduct, depending on
the facts of the particular incident.
The difference illustrates one of the central arguments of
French philosopher Michel Foucault, who wrote that social regu-
21 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). In an earlier case in which the Court found lack of standing and thus never reached
the merits, Justice Harlan in dissent noted that Connecticut asserted in defense of its ban
on contraceptives that "it considers the practice of contraception immoral in itself." Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22 478 U.S. at 191.
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lation of sexuality was transformed during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries in part by
a new specification of individuals. As defined by the an-
cient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of
forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than
the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth-century
homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history,
and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life
form, and a morphology. 23
Sex between two women or between two men has been recorded
for centuries, but the understanding of what those acts signifies
about the persons participating in them has shifted radically. "[]t
never occurred to pre-modern cultures to ascribe a person's sexual
tastes to some positive, structural, or constitutive feature of his
or her personality. 24
A rich new vein of historical analysis has begun to trace the
evolutionary changes in the social meaning of sexual practices,
including sodomy2 One British historian has argued that the shift
in popular meaning of the term "sodomite"-from that of a libertine
male sexually active with both women and men to that of an
effeminate male interested only in other men-can be pinpointed
to the first half of the eighteenth century.26 The word "homosexual"
and the idea that the homosexual was a different kind of person
were developed by late-nineteenth-century sexologists proposing
medicalized causation theories for sexual behavior.27
21 FOUCAULT, supra note 8, at 42-43 (emphasis in original).
24 HALPERIN, supra note 6, at 27.
75 In addition to the works cited in notes 6 and 12, see PASSION AND POWER: SEXUALITY
IN HISTORY (Kathy Peiss & Christina Simmons eds., 1989); JOHN D'EMILIo, SEXUAL
POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983); LILLIAN FADERMAN, SURPASSING THE LOVE OF MEN:
ROMANTIC FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE BETWEEN WOMEN FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE
PRESENT (1981); JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY
MEN IN THE U.S.A. (1976). This list does not purport to be exhaustive and specifically
does not include works focused solely on non-U.S. history.
2 Randolph Trumbach, The Birth of the Queen: Sodomy and the Emergence of Gender
Equality in Modern Culture, 1660-1750, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY, supra note 6, at 129-
40; see also DAVID GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY 309, 333-34
(1988).
27 See, e.g., JEFFREY WEEKS, COMING OUT: HOMOSEXUAL POLITICS IN BRITAIN 23-
32 (1977); George Chauncey, Jr., From Sexual Inversion to Homosexuality: Medicine and
the Changing Conceptualization of Female Deviance, 58-59 SALMAGUNDI 114 (1982-83).
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Both the indeterminacy of sodomy's meaning and Foucault's
theory on the specification of individuals are borne out in the
modem history of sodomy law. Indeed, one of the first bases on
which such laws were challenged was the very question of con-
fusion. A number of statutes that prohibited the "crime against
nature" without defining it were challenged on grounds of vague-
ness, although most were upheld with limiting constructions. 28
In the last twenty years, however, the dominant legislative
trend has been specification. The first state to decriminalize so-
domy was Illinois in 1961; in the next twenty years, nearly half
the states decriminalized all sodomy, usually by adoption of Model
Penal Code recommendations that included repeal of sodomy stat-
utes. 29 The last repeal of a sodomy law occurred in Wisconsin in
1983. Starting in the 1970s, however, a countertrend began in
which specification has replaced repeal. Since 1973, eight states
have amended their laws to specify that oral or anal sex is prohib-
ited only between persons of the same sex. 30 In one state, Okla-
28 Some state statutes still use phrases like "crime against nature." See, e.g., ARMz.
REV. STAT. § 13-1411 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:89
(West 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 272:34 (West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS Ann.
§ 750.158 (West 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (1991);
R.I. GEN. LAWS 11-10-1 (1981); and VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (1988). A Florida statute, FLA.
STAT. § 800.01 (Supp. 1973), prohibiting "the abominable and detestable crime against
nature" was upheld against a vagueness attack in Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973)
(per curiam). In a non-retroactive ruling that occurred after the conviction in Wainwright,
the Florida Supreme Court found the same statute to be unconstitutionally vague. Franklin
v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1971). The Florida court suggested that the application of the
crime against nature statute to oral sex "could entrap unsuspecting citizens and subject
them to 20-year sentences... [which] would no doubt be a shocking revelation to persons
who do not have an understanding of the meaning of the statute." Id. at 23. Decisions
holding that phrases similar to "crime against nature" provide sufficient notice of what acts
are penalized include Hogan v. State, 441 P.2d 620 (Nev. 1968) ("infamous crime against
nature"); State v. Crawford, 478 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1972) ("abominable and detestable crime
against nature"); Dixon v. State, 268 N.E.2d 84 (Ind. 1971) (same); State v. White, 217
A.2d 212 (Me. 1966) ("crime against nature"); and Warner v. State, 489 P.2d 526 (Okl.
Crim. App. 1971) (same). Cf. Balthazar v. Superior Court, 573 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1978)
(Massachusetts statute prohibiting "unnatural and lascivious acts" unconstitutionally vague
as applied to acts of fellatio and oral-anal contact).
2 NAN D. HUNTER, SHERYL L. MICHAELSON & THOMAS B. STODDARD, THE RIGHTS
OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 120 (1992).
30 ARK. CODE § 5-14-122 (1987); KAN. CraM. CODE ANN. § 21-3505 (Vernon 1992);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie 1990); Mo. REV. STAT. 566.090 (1986); MONT.
CODE § 45-5-505 (1991); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 201.190 (Michie 1986); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-510 (West 1991); and TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1989). Two of
these statutes have been ruled unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds. The Ken-
tucky statute was stricken in Commonwealth v. Wasson (Fayette Cir. Ct., Ky. 1989) (appeal
pending). Two Texas state courts have ruled the Texas statute unconstitutional: Morales
v. State, (Dist. Ct. 1990), aff'd, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 643 (Tex. App. 1992) (reported in
ARTHUR LEONARD, LESBIAN/GAY LAW NoTs 5 (1992)) and England v. State, (Travis Cty.
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homa, a state appellate court ruled on constitutional grounds that
the sodomy statute's gender neutral prohibition could not be en-
forced against opposite-sex partners. 31 Even in the majority of
states that retain gender neutral language, the ancillary effects of
the sodomy prohibition are directed against lesbian and gay
citizens. 32
It is intriguing to speculate about why state legislatures
stopped repealing sodomy statutes and began to single out homo-
sexual acts as crimes. The specification trend coincided with the
emergence of the contemporary versions of both the lesbian and
gay rights movement and a renewed movement for religious fun-
damentalism in American politics. In 1973, the year in which spec-
ification amendments began, two critical events occurred: The
American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from
its list of mental diseases 33 and the United States Civil Service
Commission forbade federal personnel supervisers from finding a
person unsuitable for a federal government job based solely on
homosexuality. 34 By 1975, anti-discrimination laws had been
adopted by the District of Columbia, San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Minneapolis, Philadelphia and several smaller cities.35 Anti-equal-
ity forces mobilized during the 1970s also, however, securing re-
peal of a civil rights law in Dade County, Florida, and conducting
two electoral campaigns to enact laws mandating the firing of state
school system employees who advocated homosexuality: one un-
successfully (California), the other successfully (Oklahoma).36 For
states revising their criminal codes, the specification of homosex-
Dist. Ct. Feb. 3, 1992) (reported in LEONARD, LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES 18, supra). The
amendments that constitute this specification trend were enacted in 1973 (Montana and
Texas); 1974 (Kentucky); 1977 (Arkansas, Missouri and Nevada); 1983 (Kansas); and 1989
(Tennessee).
3, Oklahoma v. Post, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
890 (1986).
32 See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985) (finding that a gay father who had
been awarded custody of his daughter by the trial court was unfit, presumably because of
his sexual orientation).33 RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF
DIAGNOSIS (1981).
34 See Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1979).35 THOMAS B. STODDARD, E. CARRINGTON BOGGAN, MARILYN G. HAFT, CHARLES
LISTER & JOHN P. Rupp, THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE 17 (1983). The authors also note,
regretfully, that the protective ordinances adopted by Miami and St. Paul were subsequently
modified or repealed.
36 INTIMATE MATTERS, supra note 6, at 346-47. The Oklahoma statute was declared,
in part, unconstitutional in National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ. of City of Oklahoma
City, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
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ual acts as a crime marked both the greater visibility of homosex-
uality in a positive sense and the tremendous social anxiety that
visibility generated.
The Hardwick litigation was an attempt to complete the repeal
process, but it ran headlong into the shift toward specification.
The case was based at the outset primarily on a sexual privacy
theory, encompassing the full scope of Georgia's law, which pro-
hibits oral and anal sex between any two partners, heterosexual
or homosexual, married or unmarried. Along with Michael Hard-
wick, a husband and wife couple joined as plaintiffs. They were
dismissed for lack of standing, however, in part because the district
and appellate courts concluded that because they were heterosex-
ual, they had less at stake. 37
John and Mary Doe asserted that they desired to engage in
sodomy but had been "chilled" and "deterred" by the statute.
Hardwick, by contrast, asserted that he regularly engaged in so-
domy. The Court of Appeals viewed each of them as claiming
"that their normal course of activity will lead them to violate the
statute, completely apart from their desire to invalidate it." 38 Yet,
the court ruled
Hardwick's status as a homosexual adds special credence
to his claim .... While a plaintiff hoping only to challenge
a statute might overestimate his or her willingness to risk
actual prosecution, a plaintiff who genuinely desires to
engage in conduct regardless of its legal status presents
a court with a more plausible threat of future
prosecution. 39
This contributed to what the court referred to as "the authenticity
of Hardwick's desire to engage in the proscribed activity in the
future, '40 necessarily imputing less authenticity or desire to the
married couple.
37 Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204-06 (11th Cir. 1985). Standing to challenge
a statute on its face, absent an actual prosecution, necessitates a showing both that the
plaintiff is likely to engage in conduct that runs afoul of the statute and that the government
is likely to enforce the statute. Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n., 484 U.S. 383,
392-93 (1988). In Hardwick, both aspects were found to be missing for the husband-wife
couple.
3Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1205.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1206.
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The Court of Appeals' application of standing doctrine prefi-
gured the Supreme Court's conflation of homosexuality with so-
domy. The Court of Appeals could have limited its rationale for
the standing ruling only to incidents of past enforcement or to
claims of current illegal activity. Instead, however, it suggested
that only a homosexual could be genuinely interested in engaging
in oral sex, the act for which Michael Hardwick was arrested. The
language of the standing ruling reflects a belief that the categories
"homosexual" and "heterosexual" denote radically different ex-
periences of the same behavior.
The denial of standing to the husband and wife plaintiffs so
undermined a general theory of sexual privacy that in some re-
spects, the whole story of Hardwick is revealed in the ruling on
standing. It removed the two plaintiffs who represented the full
scope of the sodomy law from the litigation, and set up a factual
context in which the Supreme Court could adjudicate the statute's
constitutionality solely "as applied to consensual homosexual
sodomy. '41
From there, the Court's opinion embarks on a series of slip-
pery substitutions between generally prohibited conduct and the
civic status of a class of people. The Court moves back and forth
from discussion of "homosexual sodomy" 42 to "the fundamental
rights of homosexuals" 43 to "the claimed constitutional right of
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy"44 to "the morality of
homosexuality. ' 45 The Court equates a subset of acts with the
rights of a class.
In so doing, the Court rewrote history to reflect a contempo-
rary preoccupation with homosexuality. The majority ignored what
Justice Stevens in dissent accurately described as "the traditional
view that sodomy is an immoral kind of conduct regardless of the
identity of the persons who engage in it. ' 46 Instead, having framed
the scope of the case as "homosexual sodomy," the Court recap-
itulated the history of sodomy law as though it, too, were limited
to homosexuality.
4" Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.2 (1986).
42 Id. at 189, 190.
43 Id. at 189, 190.
4Id. at 190-91.
45 Id. at 196.
46 Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The difference here is important for reasons of more than
historical accuracy. The Court used its version of history to claim
a kind of moral authority as much as, or more than, to discern the
views of the framers. Although homosexual sexual conduct had
been the subject of legal proscription under colonial statutes, it
was no more prohibited than some consensual heterosexual sexual
behaviors often subject to the same penalties.47 The majority used
its misreading of history to justify the condemnation of homosex-
uality, a condemnation that has been transformed by subsequent
courts into the holding of the case.
The result is an extremely paradoxical configuration of opin-
ions. Because the dissenters endorse a more liberal or tolerant
interpretation of the meaning of privacy, they may be thought also
to represent a more progressive, more forward-looking, less his-
tory-bound approach than the majority. The majority builds on a
history of censure as the primary foundation for continuing that
censure. Yet, it was the dissents, especially that of Justice Stevens,
which got the history right, refusing to distort previous meanings
of sodomy by reading into them a contemporary obsession with
homosexuality. The irony is that the dissent, rather than the ma-
jority, has history on its side.
Concomitantly, however, the conservative majority could
claim modernity in support of its focus on homosexuality. Contem-
porary social norms-as distinct from the history of sodomy
laws-do include a remaking of the understanding of which sexual
practices are condemned. New social understandings have con-
verted sodomy into a code word for homosexuality, regardless of
the statutory definition. 48 Thus, ironically, the world view of a
majority that believed its decision to be anchored in "millennia of
moral teaching"49 was actually quite contemporary in its funda-
mental approach, as well as dependent on recent social trends.
The source of authority that the majority claimed most fervently,
47 INTIMATE MATTERS, supra note 6, at 28-30; GREENBERG, supra note 26, at 304;
KATz, supra note 12, at 68, 74, 76, 85, 101.
48 Judges Canby and Norris of the Ninth Circuit are on solid legal ground when they
argue that Hardwick is not "a state license to pass 'homosexual laws."' Watkins v. U.S.
Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1354 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990). The problem with this
view is not legal but cultural-sodomy statutes are socially understood as "homosexual
laws," even if in fact or in origin they are not.
49 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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however-a strict adherence to the world view of the framers-
was an historical forgery.
II. The Current Debate
The decision in Hardwick now bedevils virtually all litigation
concerning lesbian and gay rights claims. A series of federal court
decisions have concluded that Hardwick precludes any heightened
review under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments for classifications based on sexual orientation.
A minority of judges have written that the Equal Protection ques-
tion is still open. In effect, American jurists are still asking, 350
years after the Massachusetts Bay Colony debate, what does so-
domy mean? As Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit has
written, "either Hardwick is about 'sodomy' . . . or it is about
'homosexuality. "50
The emerging majority position, adopted by the Seventh,
Ninth, D.C. and Federal Circuits, is that Hardwick is about hom-
osexuality. The opinions constituting this position share in com-
mon a conclusion that because homosexual sodomy can be made
criminal and because that "conduct defines the class," homosex-
uals as a group can be regulated by the state with no greater
justification than is required under the traditional rational basis
test.51
This conduct-centered view is premised on a radical imbal-
ance. The act of homosexual sodomy "defines the class" of gay
men and lesbians, but the same act of sodomy between opposite
sex partners does not "define the class" of heterosexuals. Heter-
osexuality discreetly disappears as a category of persons defined
by sex. Homosexual sodomy, on the other hand, not only becomes
the totality of sodomy, it also becomes the totality of
homosexuality.
Only Judge Reinhardt among the proponents of the conduct-
centered approach has sought fully to engage with this contradic-
tion. He acknowledges that the behavior in question, oral or anal
" Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1354 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
51 See High-Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563
(9th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d
454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871
F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822
F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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sex, is practiced by "a substantial majority" of both heterosexual
and homosexual persons. Indeed, the frequency of this conduct is
quite similar for the two groups .52 Reinhardt justifies the differ-
ential that he reads Hardwick to establish (but which he does not
endorse) as based on the difference that, for homosexuals alone,
such behavior "is fundamental to their very nature. '53
The illogic of the Reinhardt view, and also of the rationale for
the standing decision in Hardwick, inheres in the effort to base a
finding of intrinsic difference on precisely that which is similar.
The acts at issue in Hardwick-i.e., sodomy as defined by the
Georgia statute-are the very acts that the two groups share in
common. If there are specific sexual practices that explain the
difference between the two groups, it must be those practices that
are missing from one group and present for the other. That conduct
is procreative sexuality.
Although the distinction based on procreation has been ig-
nored in the sodomy cases, where its recognition would lead to an
extension of the Griswold-Eisenstadt principle to homosexual
acts, it has been relied on in other contexts to defeat lesbian and
gay rights claims. In Singer v. Hara, gay plaintiffs invoked a state
equal rights amendment that prohibited any differential treatment
based on sex, arguing that the marriage law could not bar a man
from marrying a man if he could marry a woman. The Washington
Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that the con-
trolling difference was the "impossibility of reproduction," a dis-
tinction sufficient to constitute a unique physical characteristic of
the sexes, and thus a defense to an ERA claim.54
The status-centered view has the better legal argument; it is
truer to the holding of Hardwick. It insists that the power of the
state to prohibit certain conduct must be applied evenhandedly. 55
It is more intellectually honest. If one imagines, for example, that
52 Data indicate that 96-99% of gay and lesbian persons have engaged in oral sex and
a smaller proportion in anal sex. PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN
COUPLES 236, 242 (1983). From 90 to 93% of heterosexual persons have engaged in oral
sex and a smaller proportion in anal sex. Id.
5 Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1357 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
54 Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. App. 1974).
55 Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1340-41. High-Tech Gays, 909 F.2d at 379 (dissent from re-
hearing en banc). Cf. Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 522-24 (7th Cir. 1982)
(even under rational basis standard of review, Chicago Fire Department could not discharge
only one of two paramedics who were equally involved in and equally responsible for an
incident involving the death of an elderly man).
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Hardwick had been decided the other way, such that the privacy
right covered acts including homosexual sodomy, there would not
be automatic invalidation of sexual orientation classifications un-
der an Equal Protection test. If we had won Hardwick, we would
not automatically, ipso facto, win a challenge to the military's
exclusion of lesbian and gay service members. The government
would still be able to argue (I believe incorrectly) that it should be
entitled to create a sexual orientation classification based on fac-
tors unrelated to whether particular conduct was criminal. 56 The
same distinction between privacy and equality holds in the oppo-
site direction: Although we lost Hardwick, our claims under the
Equal Protection Clause should not, ipso facto, be foreclosed. 7
The weakness of the status-centered view is its erasure of all
conduct and its focus solely on identity. Judges Canby and Norris
insist that the class of persons who consider themselves homosex-
ual is not "virtually identical" to those who engage in homosexual
sodomy.5 8 They are boxed into this position by a need to distin-
guish both Hardwick and Ninth Circuit precedent that held that
there was no Equal Protection violation from the government se-
lecting homosexual sodomy charges for heightened prosecution,
even under a neutral sodomy law.59 Although lesbian and gay
sexual expression does encompass many more acts than oral or
anal sex alone, the Canby-Norris argument is unpersuasive in its
refusal to acknowledge the substantial overlap.
What the status-centered view substitutes for sexual acts as
the core meaning of homosexuality is a concept of identity that is
just as "fundamental" and essentializing as conduct is in the Rein-
hardt approach. Under the status-centered view, sexual orientation
m The government's primary argument in justification of its exclusionary policy is that
other service members and the public would react negatively to the presence of openly gay
men and lesbian women in the military and that barracks life would be made uncomfortable.
See, e.g., Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1350-52. Whether this rationale amounts to more than the
invocation of prejudice may be tested in Pruitt v. Cheney, 943 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1991), in
which the court reversed the dismissal of a lesbian plaintiff's Equal Protection claim against
the policy, and directed the district court to determine whether the policy had a rational
basis under the strict rational basis analysis of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
57 Cass Sunstein has analyzed in detail the difference in function between the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, and argued that Hardwick should not be
read to determine the Equal Protection question in cases such as Watkins. Cass R. Sunstein,
Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process
and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161 (1988).
5 Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1339 n. 14.
59 Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981).
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is "a central character of individual and group identity, '60 "a cen-
tral and defining aspect" of every individual's personality. 6' Citing
the amicus brief filed by a gay rights advocacy group, Judges
Canby and Norris assert that "one is a homosexual or a hetero-
sexual while playing bridge just as much as while engaging in
sexual activity. ' '62
Both the conduct-centered and the status-centered views il-
lustrate the ascendancy of an identity definition in the debate over
the parameters of constitutional rights. The conduct-centered view
holds that what a person does determines what she is; the status-
centered view argues that her sexuality is so central to her identity
that what she is exists independently of what she does. Both
approaches would have the law institutionalize the category of
sexual orientation, albeit with radically different rationales and
opposite outcomes. The former would permit the state to use
homosexual identity as the newest bullseye at which to aim re-
pressive measures, while the latter would legitimate the same iden-
tity as the basis for an egalitarian demand.
III. Problems for the Future
In lesbian and gay rights litigation that lies in the immediate
future, correcting the misreading of Hardwick is only the first
barrier to be overcome. Successfully distinguishing the question
of governmental power to penalize sexual acts from the indepen-
dent question of whether classifications based on sexuality are
impermissibly invidious merely sets the stage for further complex
questions. Many of the thorniest challenges will come in trying to
subvert categorical modes of thinking about sexuality and sexual
orientation, while still taking advantage of a civil rights heritage
that is grounded on identity politics.
Breaking the gridlock of identity politics is no easy task. The
civil rights claim remains the most powerful device for securing
equality in American society, yet it is premised on recognition of
a coherent group identity. What often goes unspoken in the asser-
tion of such a claim is the tension between the desire to deconstruct
60 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
61 Jantz v. Muci, 759 F.Supp. 1543, 1548, 1551 (D. Kan. 1991) (appeal pending).
2 High-Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 380
(9th Cir. 1990).
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the imprisoning category itself and the need to defend those per-
sons who are disadvantaged because they bear the group label. 63
This tension is particularly acute for lesbian and gay rights
advocates, and will grow more so, for two reasons. First, the
constructionist-essentialist dispute currently dominates intellectual
debates on issues of sexuality 4 These debates have only begun
to surface in the discourse of law, but they will inevitably spread
from the non-legal activists and academics now most engaged in
them to the courts. Second, much future litigation in this area will
be grounded on Equal Protection doctrine, which directs judicial
attention to a history of group discrimination, a status of relative
political disempowerment and the indicia of identifiable group
status itself.65 Each of these criteria raises problems that are unique
to lesbian and gay rights claims and that exemplify the strategic
questions inherent in those claims.
Although a history of discrimination is perhaps the least con-
tested of these criteria,6 the view among lesbian and gay historians
that homosexuality did not exist as a concept distinct in kind from
other sexual behaviors until near the end of the last century calls
into question at least some of the more sweeping invocations of
oppression found in decisions that grant Equal Protection claims. 67
The district judge in Jantz v. Muci, for example, wrote that "stig-
matization of homosexuals has 'persisted throughout history,
across cultures."' f Hyperbole should not be necessary, however.
A century of animosity has in fact created the kind of failure in
the political system that "footnote four" principles 69 are permitted
to remedy.
61 Carole S. Vance posed the dilemma as deconstruction versus defense in her exam-
ination of the development of a social constructionist theory of sexuality. Carole S. Vance,
Social Construction Theory: Problems in the History of Sexuality, in DENNIS ALTMAN,
CAROLE VANCE, MARTHA VICINUS & JEFFREY WEEKS, HOMOSEXUALITY, WHICH HOM-
OSEXUALITY? INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAY AND LESBIAN STUDIES 13, 29 (1988).
6 See, e.g., HALPERIN, supra note 6, at 41-53.
65 See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987).
6In High-Tech Gays, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990), for example, the Ninth Circuit
panel acknowledged that this requirement for heightened scrutiny had been met, but found
the plaintiffs' claim deficient on other grounds.
67 For a gay historian's views of the problems posed by wishing to use historical
research in the effort to secure equality, see John D'Emilio, Making and Unmaking Mi-
norities: The Tensions Between Gay Politics and History, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 915 (1986).
63 Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1549 (D. Kan. 1991) (quoting 98 HARV. L. REv.
1302 (1985)). Goldstein, supra note 10, succinctly summarizes the historical evidence
indicating a much more nuanced history than simply "ancient prohibitions." Id. at 1087.
69 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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The second of the criteria for heightened scrutiny, powerless-
ness in the legislative process, has become, surprisingly, a point
of disagreement in judicial assessments of classifications based on
sexual orientation. Several courts have found that the election of
a handful of openly lesbian and gay officeholders, together with
the enactment of primarily municipal anti-discrimination laws,
demonstrate that judicial intervention is unnecessary. 70 These de-
cisions raise the threshold for heightened scrutiny to the point that
past determinations could not stand if the new standard were
applied retroactively.71
A more fair-minded approach to the question of political pow-
erlessness, however, will not necessarily be simple. Lesbian and
gay Americans present the unique problem of a minority that is
both anonymous and diffuse and insular and discreet. As a popu-
lation group, homosexually active persons live throughout the na-
tion, but the combination of social penalty and lack of a visible
marker leads to public anonymity. In many urban areas, on the
other hand, self-conscious communities have formed that have
generated a kind of ethnic politics founded on sexuality. As Bruce
Ackerman has described, Equal Protection doctrine to date has
not ventured beyond the surface in analyzing whether insular
groups are more or less disadvantaged in pluralist negotiations
than diffuse groups, or whether pariah status (a minority so stig-
matized that others are unwilling to work with them on any terms) 72
or some lesser showing of prejudice is required for judicial inter-
vention.73 Lesbian and gay rights claims may well be one of the
vehicles that forces a closer, more refined examination of these
questions.
It is the last of these three criteria, however-often described
as an immutability requirement-that poses the most troublesome
70 High-Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574; Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 7-9 (D.D.C.
1991).
71 Judges Canby and Norris argue that race would never have been ruled a suspect
classification under this standard. High-Tech Gays, 909 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1990) (rehearing
en banc denied). That is also true with regard to women, who were granted heightened
protection at a time when Congress had already enacted both the Equal Pay Act and broad
anti-discrimination laws covering employment and education, numerous states had adopted
equal rights amendments to their constitutions and a federal equal rights amendment was
under active consideration. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality).
72 Judges Canby and Norris concluded that homosexuals in fact do constitute political
pariahs. High-Tech Gays, 909 F.2d at 378.
7Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985).
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challenges. The immutability criterion forces into the forefront the
question of what causes differing sexual orientations, a question
that is by no means settled. Advocates of a rights claim for lesbians
and gay men typically have invoked an essentialist position, ar-
guing that even the most literal interpretation of immutability is
satisfied if the origins of sexual orientation lie in genes or genetic
codes, hormones or brain structure.74 Opponents of the rights
claim have focused on the volitional nature of sexual conduct. 75
Judges Canby and Norris have framed the issue as one of state
coercion, rather than absolute physical inability to change or dis-
guise a trait.76 Janet Halley argues that it is the very mutability of
sexual identity, and its creation by the process of a social and
political discourse, which should entitle it to heightened protec-
tion; otherwise the political process is skewed and delegitimized
by the systematic silencing of one voice in that discussion. 77 Hal-
ley's approach helpfully lifts the question out of the realm of
physiological determinism, a realm where, at least at present, it is
factually unresolvable.
Eschewing an essentialist claim need not be a tactical weak-
ness for equal rights advocates. Biological immutability is not an
absolute prerequisite to invalidating classifications on the basis of
that trait.78 Aliens can and do become citizens; persons can and
74 The most recent support for this position can be found in two studies, one concluding
that there may be a difference in brain structure based on sexual orientation and the second
positing a genetic difference. Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Be-
tween Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 SCIENCE 1034 (1991); J. Michael Bailey &
Richard C. PiUard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation, 48 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1089 (1991). Both have been sharply criticized on scientific grounds and socio-
political ones. See Letters to the Editor, The Politics of Finding Homosexuality Genetic,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1992, at A14 (three separate letters to the editor by Seth Manoach,
John D'Emilio and Peter Kingsley responding to a Dec. 17, 1991 Op-Ed piece by Michael
Bailey and Richard Pillard, Are Some People Born Gay?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1991, at
A21); William Byne & Bruce Parsons, Human Sexual Orientation: The Biological Theories
Reappraised (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review).
7- Woodward v. U.S., 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); High-Tech Gays v. Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,573-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Steffan v. Cheney,
780 F. Supp. 1, 8-10 (D.C. 1991).
76 Watkins v. U.S., 847 F.2d 1329, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988); High-Tech Gays v. Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 377 (Canby, Norris, JJ., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
77 Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989).
78 The question of whether immutability is required arises in overlapping analyses
under both Equal Protection Clause claims and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). In some
opinions in the former line of cases, the Supreme Court has seemed to require immutability.
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686
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do alter their religious faith group 'affiliations. 79 Neither group is
penalized for the refusal to change, even though change is possible.
Most courts in Equal Protection cases have simply listed im-
mutability as a component of the heightened scrutiny test without
considering its ramifications. Implicit and largely unexamined in
the immutability doctrine is a political choice about the social value
of the trait in question. Here too, lesbian and gay rights claims
have a potential to reshape Equal Protection jurisprudence by
shifting the focus from whether a particular trait is inherited and/
or impossible to alter, to whether individuals are being coerced
into conforming to a certain set of behaviors.
Although Equal Protection cases may be the most frequent
context for lesbian and gay rights litigants, the conceptual and
political problems that lie ahead transcend Equal Protection doc-
trine. Whichever doctrinal cards advocates play, they will be
countered with arguments born of deep cultural anxiety about
sexuality. In the hope of furthering the deconstructionist project
without torpedoing the necessary work of defense, I offer three
general suggestions for framing interventions in this discourse.
First, whatever the history of the meaning of homosexuality,
it now cannot be divorced from social conflicts over the meanings
of masculinity and femininity. It is not acts alone, but those acts
in conjunction with same-gender desire that marks homosexuality.
(1973). Cf. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). On
other occasions, the Court has analyzed the criteria for heightened scrutiny without men-
tioning immutability. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). As to § 1985(3), "[i]t is a close question" whether its protections
will be extended to a group asserting g class-based animus on any ground other than race.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983). Lower
court decisions, which the Supreme Court may soon review, have extended such protection
to women. National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.
1990), review granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070
(1991).
Some courts have rejected the search for an immutable trait, even with regard to race.
"The notion of race is a taxonomic device and, as with all such constructs, it exists in the
human mind, not as a division in the objective universe." Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547
F. Supp. 550, 565 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Professor Halley argues that the Supreme Court has
recognized, at least implicitly, that race is socially constructed rather than immutable. See
Halley, supra note 71, at 924-26, discussing Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S.
615 (1987) and Saint Francis College v. A-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
79 Alien status was granted heightened protection under the Equal Protection Clause
in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). Religious affiliation, of course, is indepen-
dently protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. It has also been
accepted as a ground that is entitled to protection under § 1985(3) despite its mutability,
although "that issue is not free from doubt." Ravenstahl v. Thomas Jefferson Hospital, 37
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 38,330, 38,332 (E.D.Pa. 1985).
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"Homosexuals are physically attracted to members of their own
sex. That is the source of the behavior that we notice about
them."80 Gender is central to sexual orientation, 81 and much of the
positive social value of homosexuality lies in its creation of a zone
of anti-orthodoxy for men and women, of whatever sexual
orientation. 82
Second, to paraphrase the issue of Hardwick's meaning as
posed by Judge Reinhardt, sodomy may be about privacy, but
homosexuality is not. The primary rationales for discrimination,
as well as the arenas in which it occurs and is experienced, concern
public perceptions, not private events. The issue that has gener-
ated most of the current judicial debate-the military's personnel
policy declaring homosexuality to be incompatible with military
service-is about secret versus public identity rather than about
status versus conduct. The military does not seek to justify its
80 High-Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 377
(9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, Norris, JJ., dissenting from denial of hearing en banc).
81 The animus directed toward lesbian and gay Americans as a result of their sexual
orientation constitutes discrimination on the basis of gender in two respects. First, and
most obviously, discrimination based on sexual orientation is a differentiation based on the
gender of one's partner. In Hardwick the dissenting justices argued that the Court should
have reached the Equal Protection claim that the sodomy statute was selectively enforced
against persons committing homosexual acts, and decided it on gender discrimination
grounds:
I do not see why the State can defend [the statute] on the ground that individuals
singled out for prosecution are of the same sex as their partners. Thus, under the
circumstances of this case, a claim under the Equal Protection Clause may well
be available without having to reach the more controversial question of whether
homosexuals are a suspect class.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 203 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and
Stevens, JJ., dissenting). This theory of sex discrimination has been rejected, however, in
Title VII cases. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
Second, and more fundamentally, homosexuality has long been viewed as a deviation
from the proper gender norms, and thus lesbian and gay persons are often held in contempt
as "queer" specifically in relation to differing codes of behavior for males and females. See
INTIMATE MA-rERS, supra note 6, at 226. Several commentators have articulated arguments
that the centrality of gender norms and sex-role stereotypes to notions of homosexuality
should be the basis for the invalidation of laws that differentiate on grounds of sexual
orientation. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the
Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. Rav. 499 (1991); Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187; I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation)
and Title VII, 91 COLuM. L. Rlv. 1158 (1991); and Andrew Koppelman, Note, The
Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988).
2 I have elaborated this argument with regard to the gay marriage debate in Nan D.
Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, in 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9 (1991).
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policy on the ground that private sexual acts render gay and lesbian
service members inept, but on the grounds that public opprobrium
toward homosexuals would imperil morale, discipline and recruit-
ment if homosexuals were openly part of the armed forces. In
numerous other cases, the asserted state interest used to justify
discrimination was a fear that equal treatment would be perceived
by the public as an endorsement of homosexuality.8 3 It is the public
process of creation, assignment and use of sexual identity-not
the right to keep private conduct secret-on which future litigation
will focus.
Lastly, lesbian and gay rights advocates must recast the terms
of the debate as to the state's interest in morality-an interest that
has been found sufficient to justify both gender neutral14 and same-
sex only85 sodomy statutes, as well as the military's anti-gay per-
sonnel policy.86 In each of these opinions, the court interpreted
"morality" to mean the suppression of homosexuality, a goal ac-
cepted as a public good.8 7 So long as discouragement of homosex-
uality is treated as a legitimate state interest, resolving such dis-
putes as the immutability debate is likely to be pointless. Even if
a predisposition to homoeroticism is substantially inborn, the gov-
ernment still can determine to seek a cure, or justify laws that
impose a social cost on its expression as a means to diminish its
public visibility, if not its private manifestations.
Whatever the merits of the argument that the government
should not be permitted to enforce a public morality because of
principles of limited government, it is likely to be largely unavail-
8 Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown Univer-
sity, 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987); Gay Lib. v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied sub nom., 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews,
544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976); Singer v. U.S. Civil Service Commission, 530 F.2d 247 (9th
Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977); Gay Students Organization of University of New
Hampshire v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, (Ist Cir. 1974); McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); Endsley v. Naes, 673 F. Supp. 1032 (D.
Kan. 1987).
8' Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186.
Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1022 (1986).
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1984), reh'g en banc denied,
746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
87 The presumptively shared interest in suppressing homosexuality also underlies a
New Hampshire state supreme court decision ruling that a law barring lesbians and gay
men from adopting children or serving as foster parents would be constitutional. In Re
Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987).
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able to litigators-at least in the federal courts-in the immediate
post-Hardwick era.8 8 In addition to arguing that "morality" is im-
permissibly subjective, lesbian and gay rights advocates must rein-
yoke the positive moral dimension of equality, a principle that
helped inspire the movement for racial civil rights. In 1963, Robert
Bork, then a law professor, argued against enactment of a federal
civil rights statute on the grounds that the moral view it embod-
ied-that segregation was wrong-should not be enforced by the
power of the state.8 9 In the Dronenburg decision, two decades
later, Judge Bork ridiculed the argument made by the gay plaintiff
that law was not and should not be based on morality. 90 Whatever
change of heart Judge Bork may have had as to the role of gov-
ernment, it is also true that during the interval the rhetoric of
morality adopted by those seeking change was appropriated by
those defending the status quo. Perhaps the biggest challenge les-
bian and gay rights advocates face is the need to shift that rhetoric
once again.
IV. Conclusion
The category "homosexuality" embodies the intersection of
nonprocreative sexual acts, the basis of sodomy laws, with same-
gender desire. Law has contributed massively to the construction
of the idea of homosexuality as a significant marker of human
identity, never more dramatically than in Bowers v. Hardwick,
when the Supreme Court's will to distinguish and specify homo-
sexual from heterosexual acts overrode the statutory text before
it. The analysis in Hardwick and its progeny supplies both sides
in the lesbian and gay rights debate with models for a coherent
group identity and definition. Although critics of many of the
assumptions in this discourse seek to deconstruct the category of
homosexuality as a fixed and natural marker, that effort should
not be misconstrued as a message that the category is insignificant,
Is Indeed, a plurality of the Court has accepted morality as a sufficient state interest
for a statute banning nude dancing, despite its admitted restrictive effects on expression.
Barnes v. Glen Theaters, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
89 Robert Bork, Civil Rights-A Challenge, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21.
9 741 F.2d at 1397 n.6.
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trivial or ephemeral. Many of our most important social and polit-
ical questions implicate issues of sexuality. The idea of homosex-
uality is no more demeaned by its status as a cultural invention
than is Keynesian economics or the First Amendment. Advocates
of rights claims now have the opportunity to reconstruct as polit-
ical what has been stigmatized as sexual.
